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When we think about the concept of human rights—including all the pos-
sible ways of its realization, and considering the complementarities and also the
unity of different dimensions of the concept—we confront several difficult
questions.  In particular, in an age when constitutions and constitutional doc-
trine have already incorporated a substantive body of human rights law, we
must address how some of the constitutional promises regarding individual
rights have not been fulfilled.  Additionally, we must consider how rights that
foster solidarity in the economic, social, and cultural spheres have not been
recognized.
This article operates on two levels.  On one level, we intend to point out
the need, particularly in Brazil, to face the challenge of making the republican
constitutional text a reality in the lives of the people.  This challenge requires
us to acknowledge and address failures to guarantee basic and fundamental
rights identified with a so-called democratic state of law established by the 1st
article of the 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution, which supposes that all
“promises of the modern era” should be implemented specially in periods of
profound crises.
On the other level, we also intend to demonstrate that we can “learn from”
and “teach to” other cultures, starting from our own pre-comprehensions.  We
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draw from Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and Boaventura
de Sousa Santos’ diatopic hermeneutics to demonstrate that the problem sur-
rounding the effectiveness of human rights in a country with delayed moder-
nity, such as Brazil, can be understood based on the proximity between the two
hermeneutical “sides” of the debates.  Inspired by Gadamer, the task is to pro-
mote an opening without systematic coercion and without drama.  Santos’
diatopic hermeneutics provides additional details regarding this opening.
In practical terms, we will outline the conditions that make it generally
possible to implement the fundamental rights that are included in modern con-
stitutional texts as promises of a fair, just, and unified society, as is the case of
the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.  Even classic rights of individual freedom have
been undermined and not fully implemented in Brazil and other countries
despite the fact that they are related to the origin and fundamental contents of
the liberal economic order, and even though there is broad consensus that the
state should protect these rights in order to ensure the dignity of its citizenry.
One important challenge for nations is to implement human rights through
juridical practices within the national context, all the while keeping in mind the
myriad social and economic ramifications of globalization.  Juridical practices
are possible only within a language community, but today legal language com-
munities must be open to translation to other cultures and knowledge.
Democratic states governed by the rule of law have a transforming charac-
ter; they are a humanitarian inheritance that defines part of our present and
future.
We can refer to the need for constant revitalization, not only of the proper
contents of these humanitarian pretensions but specially to the mechanisms that
make them effective, and it is essential that we always have in mind the need to
build tools that increasingly facilitate the practice and enable the use of these
contents.1
We look to the propelling force of republicanism and its instruments to
implement constitutional principles and norms, and reaffirm its capacity to
enable the fulfillment of the promise of democratic states governed by the rule
of law.
I. “CONSTITUTIONAL TEMPORALITY” IN THE REPUBLIC OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
MUTUAL LEARNING AS EXPLAINED BY PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS AND DIATOPIC HERMENEUTICS
The need to protect human rights has long been an important theme in
modern juridical studies and writings by those, like us, seeking to ensure a
better quality of life for individuals, social groups, and humankind in general.
Scholars, social scientists, social workers, politicians, and many others have
been working to build a trans-disciplinary vision of human rights.  This diverse
community of human rights advocates is fighting for the development, imple-
mentation, and actual achievement of human rights through projects, studies,
and research.  The goals of these actions include trying to improve knowledge
1 JOS ´E LUIS BOLZAN DE MORAIS, AS CRISES DO ESTADO E DA CONSTITUIC¸ ˜AO E A TRANS-
FORMAC¸ ˜AO ESPACIAL DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS 83 (2002) (translated for this article by
Saldanha and Morais).
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and juridical practice in order to guarantee the efficacy and accomplishment of
recognized human rights—whether traditionally understood, or new rights—
while also specifying new instruments and spaces for concretization, including
areas in the governmental domain.  This effort holds importance for the ongo-
ing debate about the role of constitutional adjudication and its effectiveness,
and the recognition of judicial activism by courts and judges.
When discussing human rights, it is important to consider not only
changes that have occurred naturally according to societal evolution, but also
that, human rights were not born all in one time, they are historical and are
created in accordance with political and social historical movements or situa-
tions favorable to their development and the necessity that society possesses to
implement them because of circumstances and as well as political and eco-
nomic crises experienced by Nations-States,2 as Norberto Bobbio argues in his
book, A ERA DOS DIREITOS.  The government has the capacity to determine and
to implement those rights.  Jose´ Eduardo Faria3 suggests that the idea of human
rights includes several dimensions that can be linked to different government
branches or functions:  Civil and political citizenship (the first dimension) is
linked to legislative function; social and economic citizenship (the second
dimension) is linked to the executive branch through public policies; and post-
material citizenship (the third dimension) is linked to the judicial function in
applying and guaranteeing the implementation of those rights.4
We think of human rights as being universal, but this means that they are
expanding their content and maintaining their temporal character without
becoming merely circumstantial.  They are historical in the sense of not being
definitive, that is, constantly requiring the incorporation of new contents (and,
consequently, new instruments) to preserve and effectuate the re-organization
of institutional structures of the State.  The catalog of human rights will never
be dissociated from the tradition and worldviews that have arisen in the public
life of a particular community.
We prefer to affirm that human rights become general, and thus spread to
other legal cultures, in the sense we observe a deepening of their contents under
the mantle of fundamental rights.5  This perspective calls upon us to regard
individuals as having first dimension rights and to recognize their individual
interests.6
The first real challenge of this debate is that, despite the legitimacy that
follows from the recognition and acceptance of several dimensions of different
generations of human rights by many different governments with different ide-
2 NORBERTO BOBBIO & CARLOS NELSON COUTINHO, A ERA DOS DIREITOS 32 (7th ed.
1992).  Several authors write about this theme along with Bobbio. See, e.g., INGO WOLF-
GANG SARLET, A EFIC ´ACIA DOS DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS:  UMA TEORIA GERAL DOS
DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS NA PERSPECTIVA CONSTITUCIONAL (1998).
3 JOS ´E EDUARDO FARIA, DIREITOS HUMANOS E GLOBALIZAC¸ ˜AO ECON ˆOMICA:  NOTAS PARA
UMA DISCUS ˜AO (1997).
4 There is no conceptual consensus about the dimensions of human rights.  Some authors
divide them into different generations according to different primary conceptions.
5 We adopt a simplified concept of fundamental rights in order to understand those written
and expressly recognized in a particular juridical order.
6 For reference, see JOS ´E LUIS BOLZAN DE MORAIS, DO DIREITO SOCIAL AOS INTERESSES
TRANSINDIVIDUAIS:  O ESTADO E O DIREITO NA ORDEM CONTEMPOR ˆANEA (1996).
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ologies, attempts to effectuate those rights run into serious impediments, both
political and practical.  There are several authoritarian governments around the
world that reflect crises of the nation-states as institutions, leading to several
reform proposals to re-build their fundamentals as social states.  This predica-
ment is particularly true in countries based in Roman-German juridical systems
that have to relate to similar juridical orders, especially the international order,
which then has an enormous influence on the internal public policy choices
made by these countries.  This motivates our effort to find and develop new
instruments, more effective mechanisms—as understood by Jorge Miranda7—
to regulate human rights in all of its dimensions.
Additionally, we do not ignore the Occidental assumption of a complete
conception of human rights that is still largely individualistic in character.8  On
one hand, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics facilitates freeing ourselves
from an outdated parochialism with hegemonic pretensions, and supplies a crit-
ical view of the topics related to the Occidental tradition regarding these rights.
Human rights arise from a horizon of meanings that is the product of a fusion
of horizons that only appear to be wholly distinct.  In language, we can over-
come the unproductive prejudice in favor of the individualistic approach to
human rights and move toward a broader conception that recognizes the need to
reevaluate one’s own tradition in order to reinvigorate the legal effectiveness of
human rights concepts.9
Santos’ diatopic hermeneutics10 relates to Gadamer’s philosophical her-
meneutics by focusing on how prejudices—pre-judgments or pre-understand-
ings—are confronted by distinct knowledge from different cultures, resulting in
an interpretative effort among two or more cultures to identify isomorphic con-
cerns that they share and the different responses that they may present. Brought
to bear on the field of human rights, diatopic hermeneutics brings us into prox-
imity with the human dignity of the Occidental world, the Arabic umma view
and the Hindu conception of dharma.
Diatopic hermeneutics makes it possible to exceed the individualistic
prejudice of human rights in the Occidental world by recognizing that one’s
tradition always potentially lacks authenticity, as urged by Gadamer’s philo-
sophical hermeneutics by promoting the opening of one’s judicial traditions to
those of another, and regarding human rights as having a collective and human-
itarian character rather than merely an individual character.
It is important to remember that we not only must build legal and social
instruments that can help humanity experience human rights, we also have the
duty to enable the juridical community to protect human rights effectively.  In
Brazil, this means bringing our 1988 Federal Constitution, which embodies and
7 Regarding the international juridical order and human rights, see FLAVIA PIOVESAN ET AL.,
COMENT ´ARIOS `A REFORMA DO JUDICI ´ARIO (2005), and our commentaries regarding recent
changes on the 5th rule of the 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution.
8 This refers to the individualism that was born with modernity and that put the individual as
the center of the social order, which transformed later into possessive individualism and is
the mark of contemporary society.  On this subject, see the works of Louis Domunt.
9 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, ACOTACIONES HERMEN ˆEUTICAS 16 (Ana Agud & Rafael de
Agapito trans., 2002).
10 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Para uma Sociologia das Auseˆncias e uma Sociologia das
Emergeˆncias, 63 REVISTA CR´ITICA DE CIENCIAS SOCIAIS 237 (2002).
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guarantees fundamental rights, in line with modern constitutionalism and with
the ideals of a democratic state of law.  In other cultures, we need to know how
to recognize the unwarranted extension of the individualist paradigm of human
rights to the degree that it silences the collective perspective in this matter.
Our linguistic nature is the condition for the possibility of this inter-cul-
tural understanding, because language works as a way, not as a bridge, by
which people have access to their objects.  It is characterized by the construc-
tive space of its own experience of the world11 in which the objects are human
rights.
The question then becomes whether the Occidental pretention regarding
the universality of human rights can be valid, given its individualistic articula-
tion.  Santos responds in two ways.  First, an individualistic conception is too
narrow because “if the world is an inexhaustible totality, a lot of totalities fit in
it, even if partially.”12  Second, if there were no social dimension, how can we
claim that a better world is possible, and what motivates us to seek its
realization?
Addressing the first problem, which essentially contests the effectiveness
of human rights, Santos proposes the “translation theory” as an alternative.
This consists of the possibility of creating a reciprocal intelligibility among the
diversity of experiences in the world, which opens the space between the
existing and the possible.  The work of translation brings into sharp relief the
hegemonic character of many social experiences and the potential for moving
beyond them.  Diatopic hermeneutics relates the isomorphic concern with the
same topic presented in different cultures.  In the field of human rights, the
shared concern is human dignity, and this concern is addressed variously from
an individualistic or collective approach.  By appreciating these differences in a
fusion of horizons, new understandings may emerge.
In our view, the connections between diatopic hermeneutics—translating
the efforts of different cultures to address the same topic (in the specific case of
this article, the implementation of human rights to respect human dignity)—
with the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer is particularly
obvious when we consider that Gadamer regards understanding not as an indi-
vidual activity directed at the text, but rather in textuality and linguisticality.
Seen in this way, the text is not an “expression” that needs retrospective resus-
citation of the expressive movement in which it was produced.
By using the frame of philosophical hermeneutics to explore the effective-
ness of human rights, we can examine the limitations of the liberal scheme
while acknowledging the successful creation of rights.  If Gadamer is correct
that texts pose a persistent challenge to our prejudices, then the Federal Consti-
tution can provoke our recognition that the communitarian model is raised even
by the present individualistic understanding.  Dialogue between Gadamer and
Santos helps us to chart the passage from an individualistic to a communitarian
conception by focusing on the isomorphic concern with human rights and dig-
11 Eduardo Carlos Bianca Bittar, Hans-Georg Gadamer:  A Experieˆncia Hermeneˆutica e a
Experieˆncia Jurı´dica, in HERMEN ˆEUTICA PLURAL:  POSSIBILIDADES JUSFILOS ´OFICAS EM CON-
TEXTOS IMPERFEITOS 199 (Carlos E. De Abreu Boucault ed., 2002).
12 Id. at 30 (translated for this article by Saldanha and Morais).
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nity, as expressed not only in cultures such as our own, but also in others in
which communitarian interests are viewed as the most significant.
The importance of this debate has to be acknowledged in legal thought
because law exemplifies the hermeneutical situation due to the historical and
contingent character of law.  However, we must keep in mind the need for
effective constitutional protection of basic rights, not only in the political spec-
trum, but also at the level of civil society that can undermine the civil rights
already consolidated and in effect.  Civil society must respond to new chal-
lenges and promote strategies independent of the public policies of the legal
realm in response to the daily disrespect of human rights affecting not only the
content of social rights, but also the content of legally-implemented civil rights
that ensure individual rights.
The challenge we embrace is to reconcile two conceptions of human
rights—individual and social—in a social environment in which individualism
is the guiding value, and the tradition is fundamentally understood in terms of
an economic model.  But it cannot be forgotten that part of the tradition’s
essence is to appropriate and reproduce, and so it is also intrinsic to the human
condition to break, critique, unmake, and (re)make.  If we find on one side the
need to understand the limitations on the substantial effectiveness of imple-
menting human rights, and, on the other side, the claim to universality, philo-
sophical hermeneutics teaches that understanding is, in truth, a project.13
That’s why Gadamer claims that it is “only through others that we understand
ourselves.”14  With that in mind, we can regard understanding as the intersec-
tion between philosophical hermeneutics and diatopic hermeneutics.  Gadamer
leads us to search for “wisdom” from different cultures as the appropriate
response to the recognition of our own culture incompleteness, and this is par-
ticularly important in the human rights field.
II. A HERMENEUTICAL APPLICATION TO ASSIST IN
EXPANDING HUMAN RIGHTS
Furthermore, we might ask why we should seek to expand the implemen-
tation of human rights based on hermeneutical strategies to enlarge the spec-
trum of constitutional guarantees and procedural mechanisms of protection,
given the normative crises of the State in general as state form losing its power
of enforcement and collapsing under economic and parastatals15 structures.
The answer is that we cannot constrain our ongoing debates about human rights
by assuming that success and effectiveness depend exclusively on strengthen-
ing law-related mechanisms, given their occasional collapse in confrontation
with the public-privatized sphere.
In addition, there is a direct relationship between democracy and human
rights.  When democracy is weakened, human rights are the first casualty. And
13 See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 34 (3d ed. Continuum Books 2004)
(1975).
14 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, O PROBLEMA DA CONSCI ˆENCIA HIST ´ORICA 12-16 (2003); Hans-
Georg Gadamer, The Problem of Historical Consciousness, 5 GRADUATE FAC. PHIL. J. 8-56
(Jeff L. Close trans., 1975).
15 Parastatal is an autarchy that has state intervention on its frame and administration.
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where democratic institutions do not have sufficient power to sustain all dimen-
sions of human rights, Renato Janine Ribeiro reminds us that the very legiti-
macy of the state is put into question.16
We must honestly embrace the fact that the law expresses itself by sym-
bols.  In order to be recognized, symbols must be effectuated in the context of
human practice.  Such a process consists in the passage from the rule to reality,
which is a reconstruction of the rule through hermeneutic application.  We, as
historical beings, must always recapture the past and actively cultivate the tra-
dition, recognizing our embeddedness in tradition while also recognizing the
demands of the present.  This process is enriched if human rights are pursued
with the recognition that diverse cultures, that is, those that are distinct from
ours, have common concerns about the minimal standards of democracy.
To effectuate diatopic hermeneutics, it is very important to keep in mind
Gadamer’s phenomenological idea of pre-conception, the previously-formed
concepts that constitute and form knowledge structures.  This is the basis of the
famous “hermeneutic circle”:  Because the translator knows things through her
pre-conceptions, she can relate them to the present hermeneutic task, and in
some cases the present task will illuminate the unproductive character of the
preconceptions that she brings to bear.17
The emergence of the constitutional state and its recognition of human
rights are presented as a great achievement that is inextricably linked to the
liberal historical tradition.  Consequently, there is tremendous resistance to the
implementation of social rights based on a collective profile that, frequently, is
trans-individual in character.  The rule of law is equated with the values of the
neoliberal state—which are the values of mercantile society—although the very
language in which this individualistic principle is posited is a social activity.
The liberal tradition is not bad, but we too often apply it without adopting
a self-critical posture.  Self-criticism is the basis of understanding and knowl-
edge, and, consequently, is essential to society.  Acknowledging the logical-
formal-liberal definition of human rights, based on the paradigm of rights and
negative freedoms, permits us to assess whether these structures will continue
to be fully responsive to contemporary reality.
III. REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEIR SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE:  THE
HERMENEUTICAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE FULFILLMENT
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS BY THE STATE
Although human rights arose within a particular culture, at a certain point
in history, and in the context of the liberal mindset, our understanding of
16 See RENATO JANINE RIBEIRO, PRIMAZIAS DA DEMOCRACIA 5-13 (1997).  The ethical value
of democracy causes its rights to have superiority over all other possible rights, but on the
other hand, these rights are only assured when there is a so-called hard center of democratic
rights.
17 Heidegger’s concept of the hermeneutic circle is important to the law and to the task of
the translator because it articulates the condition of the possibility of the blossoming of
singularity.  For that matter, Heidegger said, “[E]ach thing is one and not the other.” MAR-
TIN HEIDEGGER & CARLOS MORUJ ˜AO, QUE ´E UMA COISA?:  DOUTRINA DE KANT DOS
PRINCIPIOS TRANSCENDENTAIS 25 (1992) (translated for this article by Saldanha and Morais);
see also Bittar, supra note 11, at 184.
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human rights is expanded by moving beyond these circumstances.  We will
highlight human rights whose content have a collective character.  Economic,
social, and cultural rights not only require legislative recognition and an atti-
tude of abstention from government authorities; they also require a concrete or
positive attitude of public officers and legal entities in the manner in which
they implement public policies, as well as a jurisdictional recognition of their
legitimacy and importance in the democratic sphere.
The juridical practices and procedures developed to flesh out the individ-
ual contents of human rights have contributed to a crisis because they have
become incapable of dealing with a broader social dimension of rights.  These
practices developed in a determinate historical moment in which it was neces-
sary to worship the mercantile values of the liberal state.
This narrow perspective is not intrinsically bad, but it follows from an
uncritical disposition.  Contemporary translators of human rights must always
question their own prejudices in order to maximize knowledge.18  Legal author-
ity is always exercised in a determinate culture, on the basis of a determinate
history and within a particular context.  We must break free from the logical-
formal definition of human rights based on the subject-object separation if
these structures are expected to be flexible and adaptive so as to deal with
contemporary reality.
Drawing from Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics,19 we can under-
stand the consequences of the reproduction of procedural uniformities that
ignore history and impose a limited model of human rights.  And, drawing from
diatopic hermeneutics, which assumes the incompleteness of all uniformity or
of all pre-given abstraction, we will look to intercultural translation to give
value to social rights that originate from a communitarian conception of world
and are found in other political regimes, thereby spurring the democratic
imagination.
IV. THE FIRST PERSPECTIVE FOR IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RIGHTS
In order to implement human rights with social contents, two different,
though not mutually exclusive, perspectives may be utilized.  First, one must
identify how social human rights can be implemented by the nation-state.  This
involves verifying the role of public institutions in obtaining maximum effec-
tiveness of their content, and requiring a normative legislative or constitutional
recognition, such as Article 5 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.  Article 5 has
played a fundamental role in guaranteeing “negative rights liberties,” but has
been insufficient to guarantee social, economic, and cultural rights.
Legislative action must be supplemented with an enabling tool to secure
“positive liberties” originating in executive mandates by state authorities
designed to implement normative rights.  There is a granting or serviceable
notion linked to the implementation of social, economic, and cultural rights that
gather all questioning about state reforms, in particular, those related to neo-
liberal and capitalism ideals.  Therefore, when implementing those rights, there
18 Gadamer makes this same point by claiming that historical knowledge can enrich,
change, confirm, or modify understanding. See GADAMER, supra note 14, at 8-56.
19 GADAMER, supra note 9, at 154.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-3\NVJ305.txt unknown Seq: 9 26-OCT-10 10:28
Summer 2010] CONSTITUTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND REPUBLIC 675
is a need to understand the crises of contemporary states as a conceptual matter,
specifically related to sovereignty problems, structural crisis related to budget-
ary issues, and ideological and philosophical problems of the welfare state.20
We must address the power of language if we are to comprehend the meaning
of the Constitution and the values it embodies.  After the linguistic turn in phi-
losophy during the twentieth century, particularly Martin Heidegger’s21 and
Gadamer’s22 philosophical hermeneutics, we now acknowledge that law is not
grounded on absolute and primeval truths.  In this new era, we acknowledge the
shortcomings of modernity and embrace the interpretive nature of knowledge.
Hermeneutical understanding, according to Gadamer, is a response to a
message that arrives before the messenger.  That is why being that can be
understood is language.23  If language is the universal medium in which under-
standing24 occurs, language constitutes man and society.  In language, man has
access to things, but also access to the need for an unveiling of a new judicial-
political-social human rights structure.  Language is not a tool wielded by man.
Rather, it is a social medium through which man exists.25  This undermines the
logical-formal perspective by acknowledging that meaning is a product of a
particular culture at a particular moment in history.  We can never know some-
thing in its entirety, abstracted from specific concerns.  It is here that logic
fails!26  This is the point where diatopic hermeneutics and the metaphor of
translation in philosophical hermeneutics converge and provide a realistic basis
for understanding human rights in a social sense, based on community.
On the other hand, as we mentioned before, it is important to think about
human rights implemented through adjudication, which is the third dimension
of the implementation of rights.  All actors in the legal sphere must understand
that the limited character of judicial functions must be appreciated by all law-
related actors in order to foster the development of human rights through the
efforts of all citizens.  We cannot look only to judges when an unstable political
scenario underscores the insufficient realization, or complete absence of social
human rights, because this context fosters continuing political instability and
judicial politicization.
There is a fundamental problem when constitutional theory and practice
begin with the understanding of constitutional norms and their role in guaran-
20 See AS CRISES DO ESTADO CONTEMPOR ˆANEO, in AM ´ERICA LATINA: CIDADANIA,
DESENVOLVIMENTO E ESTADO 38 (Deisy de Freitas Lima Ventura ed., 1996), Porto Alegre:
Livraria do Advogado.
21 Gadamer’s great mentor was Martin Heidegger.  Hermeneutic phenomenology has  three
evolutionary moments:  a) Heidegger I, the existential analytical phase up to 1920; b)
Heidegger II, the philosopher of the metaphysical overcoming and the being of forgetfulness
in the years following Being and Time; and c) Heidegger III, the contemporary philosopher
in the post-War period.  These phases join to form a unique Heidegger, who cannot be
understood in discrete pieces. ERNILDO STEIN, PENSAR ´E PENSAR A DIFERENCA:  FILOSOFIA E
CONHECIMENTO EMP´IRICO 22-28 (2002).
22 Hans-Georg Gadamer was one of the main disciples of Martin Heidegger and his main
work was TRUTH AND METHOD (1960), which reflected upon the historical and philosophical
conditions of comprehension and interpretation.
23 See GADAMER, supra note 13, at 407.
24 Id. at 309.
25 GADAMER, supra note 9, at 25.
26 ERNILDO STEIN, APROXIMAC¸ ˜OES SOBRE HERMEN ˆEUTICA 18 (1996).
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teeing the enforcement of rights as abstract matters but do not ensure their
enforcement by the authorities, because in this situation citizens do not experi-
ence human rights in their lives.  This situation underscores the profound
necessity for effective state structures in addition to general state-based legiti-
macy.  State structures can be effective only if they are deconstructed,27 which
is, without a doubt, a task of hermeneutics when it is freed of methodologism
and regarded as a feature of all human communication.
This confirms Gadamer’s28 teaching that the process of understanding is
not wholly a reproductive act, which is to say that understanding is not an ideal
outside the experience of human life, as in Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophical
work, but rather originates in human-being-in-the-world.  This posture demon-
strates that Gadamer29 went beyond the later Heidegger of “the turn” (Kehre).
Gadamer does not conceive of philosophical hermeneutics as an inquiry into
what we think and want, as we see in Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism,30 but
rather into what determines our existence.  This opens the space for the diver-
sity that is valued by diatopic hermeneutics.  In turn, this promotes the transla-
tion between hegemonic knowledge and counter-hegemonic impulses present
in language—constitutional or not—resulting in the construction of reciprocal
intelligibilities31 that permits concretization of what had formerly been elided,
such as social human rights.
Konrad Hesse32 emphasizes that we must consider how to implement
norms that have the promise of instantiating principles such as constitutional
unity, practical agreement, functional accuracy, absolute integration, and con-
stitutional normative force (maximum effectiveness).  This situation demands
that we perceive and acknowledge constitutional provisions in their full norma-
tive complexity rather than regarding them as written rules.33
Accurately perceiving this problematic demand requires the jurist to have
a pre-comprehension that has developed historically.  Regardless of the juris-
diction and its particular development of human rights, this process always
begins with a traditionary horizon.
It is important to understand that preconceptions are not part of a singular
pre-concept embodied in a constitution’s interpreter; rather, they are the histori-
cal reality from which the interpreter arises.34  Thus, we surpass the philosophy
of subjectivity.  The interpreter is always inside the medium of hermeneutic
27 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, EL GIRO HERMEN ´EUTICO 85 (3d ed. 2007).
28 See GADAMER, supra note 13, at 250-51.
29 Id. at 14.
30 MARTIN HEIDEGGER, CARTA SOBRE EL HUMANISMO 1 (Helena Corte´s & Arturo Leyte
trans., 2000).
31 Santos, supra note 10, at 34.
32 See KONRAD HESSE, A FORC¸A NORMATIVA DA CONSTITUIC¸ ˜AO (Gilmar Ferreira Mendes
trans., 1991).  For the hermeneutics point of view, see LENIO LUIZ STRECK, HERMEN ˆEUTICA
JUR´IDICA E(M) CRISE:  UMA EXPLORAC¸ ˜AO DO DIREITO (1999).
33 See FERDINAND LASSALLE, A ESS ˆENCIA DA CONSTITUIC¸ ˜AO 31-32 (Editora Liber Juris
1985) (1933).
34 If comprehension always arises from historical consciousness, tradition can never be
absolute and we must recognize that its influence is subject to critique and revision. MAN-
FREDO ARA ´UJO DE OLIVEIRA, REVIRAVOLTA LING ¨U´ISTICO-PRAGM ´ATICA NA FILOSOF´IA CON-
TEMPOR ˆANEA 226-27 (1996).
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experience through dialogue, which derives from the pre-conceptual35 struc-
ture of all comprehension.  Moreover, because hermeneutic consciousness is
always limited as a result of the finite character of human existence and the
historical character of culture,36 there is an opening to Santos’ diatopic
hermeneutics.
Most constitutions have embedded procedural instruments available to all
citizens, such as habeas data, habeas corpus, writ of mandamus, collective man-
damus writ for diffused interests, and actions to challenge the constitutionality
of a statute.  This is not an easy task to perform when one is mindful of the
structures and formation of contemporary states, all of the actors involved and,
the nature of the constitution as a political-juridical document with deep ten-
sions and power disputes.  Fundamentally, what must be understood is that
study and advocacy for the implementation of human rights rests on a concep-
tion of the constitution not as a government program, but instead as embodying
norms and principles with which the government must abide.  Government pro-
grams need to be constitutionalized, and this requires a critical hermeneutic
horizon—which according to Gadamer, means not to be captivated by unpro-
ductive prejudices but to be able to see beyond them37—that will engender a
new conception of constitutionalism to provide a new layer of meaning to the
jurisdictional function by putting the tradition to the test of questioning.
V. THE SECOND PERSPECTIVE FOR IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RIGHTS
There is a second major perspective from which to regard the implementa-
tion of human rights in a social analysis:  making use of humanitarian policies
developed and implemented by social actors and aiming at concretizing emerg-
ing rights derived from new conflicting zones as fundamental rights.  We may
regard this process in two ways:  First, one must focus on public authorities
who implement the precise content of those rights.  Second, one must focus on
the involvement of civil society, and not simply within the paradigm of neo-
liberal political thought and capitalist economics.  The idea is a collective effort
to conceive social welfare benefits in new ways that might have nothing to do
with the policies developed by the structures of the welfare state.
In this way, one might develop new experiences that arise from a flexible
participation in representative democracy and might even implement indepen-
dent policies that break with the ideological character of transference typical of
the representative model and are closer to the context of a theory that we can
only gradually begin to reconstruct.  In contrast to the model of science where
attaining knowledge rests on the verification of the facts, in a field of a human
35 Id. at 227.
36 JEAN GRONDIN, INTRODUCCION A LA HERMEN ˆEUTICA FILOS ´OFICA 174-75 (Angela Ack-
ermann Pila´ri trans., 1999).
37 GADAMER, supra note 13, at 301; see also STRECK, supra note 32, at 269.  In another
passage, Streck suggests that if a restricted hermeneutics is pursued, it will be much more
difficult to recognize public rights such as giving citizens access to medicines and health
insurance on the basis that they are guaranteed by Article 196 of the Brazilian Federal
Constitution.
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science such as law, the hermeutical relation38 between fact and theory is deci-
sive.  The feasibility of this inquiry depends on a rupture with the ideal of a
static and predictable39 jurisprudence that produces results in the fulfillment of
human rights through unchanging questions.
This is the critical contribution of translation provided by diatopic herme-
neutics.  Translation is necessary between those who locate rights in the Brazil-
ian Constitution and those agents who seek to fulfill them.  Boaventura de
Sousa Santos affirms that all practices involve knowledge, and for that reason
are knowledge practices.  Moreover, translation seeks to create reciprocal intel-
ligibilities between organizational forms and action objectives.40  In Gadamer’s
terms, this requires recourse to the field of pre-comprehension and the suspen-
sion of inauthentic narrowness.
VI. RE-THINKING THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE
One of the main themes of constitutional theory is the need to revise the
role and functions of the state, re-thinking its limits, obligations, and, most
importantly, the function of the judiciary in contemporary constitutionalism
premised on both democracy and the rule of law.41  The judiciary has a central
and important role in guaranteeing the achievement and enforcement of consti-
tutional rights under almost all of the constitutions formed after World War II.
In this context, constitutional theory obtains a new dimension and is
enlarged by comprehending the text not only as a legislative act but also as a
historical-cultural document to be interpreted.  To understand is to relate to
tradition—which includes not only individual human rights but also collective
human rights.  Through a hermeneutical circle we realize that understanding is
not an easy repetition of the tradition, but instead moves beyond it by recogniz-
ing that connections do not happen naturally, or without problems.  The media-
tive hermeneutical task42 lives precisely in this aspect.  The interpreter finds
himself outside his traditionary belonging and gains critical distance from the
object he seeks to understand, whether it is a legal text, a concrete case, or a
constitution.
It means that, against the arbitrary meaning generated by a comfortable
understanding,43 we should approach texts differently.  This demands an alert
view.  It means that the interpreter, such as the judge in her daily routine, must
38 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PRAISE OF THEORY:  SPEECHES AND ESSAYS 55 (Chris Dawson
trans., Yale Univ. 1998) (1983).
39 As a matter of fact, a jurisdiction based on the hermeneutical comprehension and, for that
matter, on the rise of the singularity, do not unite with neoliberal thought of having a juris-
diction that is capable of giving predictable results. See the World Bank Report; Ana Paula
Lucena Silva Candeas, Valores e os Judicia´rios, Os Valores Recomendados Pelo Banco
Mundial Para os Judicia´rios Nacionais, CIDADANIA E JUSTICA, 1st Semester 2004, at 21.
40 SANTOS, supra note 10, at 134.
41 For a full understanding of the meaning of Democratic State of Law, see LENIO LUIZ
STRECK & JOS ´E LUIS BOLZAN DE MORAIS, CI ˆENCIA POL´ITICA E TEORIA GERAL DO ESTADO
(4th ed. 2000).
42 GADAMER, supra note 14, at 8-56.
43 GADAMER, supra note 13, at 269.
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always be alert to the need to replace previous knowledge by constantly re-
projecting pre-understandings to new understanding.
Diatopic hermeneutics provides the same lesson.  Translation embodies
the understanding that unites and separates theory and practice—our main con-
cern when we deal with human rights—and determines the limits and possibili-
ties of articulation based not only on reading a constitution, but also embracing
models of democracy where social and collective rights are central.
A constitution—considered substantively44—raises its own legitimacy
and the question of its role.  According to Ha¨berle, constitutional texts in the
strict sense, formal written constitutions in the broad sense and also the mate-
rial of classical works of Aristotle (relating to equality and justice), of Montes-
quieu (in terms of separation of power) or of Hans Jonas on protection of the
environment, understood as a Kantian categorical imperative, extended both in
space and in time the whole world.45
Today there is a conception of a constitution, above and beyond all new
contents and strategies that is rooted in its nature as a juridical-historical and
cultural product that self-referentially raises the problem of its concretization
and the attribution of meaning.  This calls for a re-thinking of the typical and
classic role of the state in an environment that seemingly offers few options for
effective changes in political institutions.46  In turn, this places a far greater
burden on constitutional jurisprudence47 than merely applying juridical norms
and establishing the hierarchy of rules.
44 There is also a formalist perspective of the constitution as described by Giovanni Sartori
in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING:  AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCEN-
TIVES AND OUTCOMES (2d ed. 1997).  Sartori states that a constitution is above all and prima-
rily a government instrument that limits, curtails and allows control of the exercise of
political power. Id. at 200.  That is, constitutions are “rules” that structure and discipline
decisional processes of the state; they are a set of content-neutral procedures whose purpose
is “to ensure a controlled exercise of power.” Id.  Regarding this doctrine, “[w]e must
beware . . . of ‘aspirational constitutions’. . . . Aspirational constitutions are, in the end, a
deviation and an overload of constitutional capacities that results, in turn, in their failure to
function.” Id.
Matteucci and Clavero state:
The written constitution draws its legitimacy from two elements:  the content of the standards,
which are implemented for their intrinsic rationality and justice, in a formal source, emanate
from the sovereign will of the people through a constituent assembly and, at times, a referendum
. . . The second character refers to the function:  a written constitution is desired not only to
prevent arbitrary government and establish a limited government, but to guarantee the rights of
citizens and to prevent the state from violating these rights.  In effect, the constitution not only
regulates the operation of state agencies, but also enshrines the rights of citizens, set as limits to
state power.
NICOLA MATTEUCCI & BARTOLOM ´E CLAVERO, ORGANIZACI ´ON DEL PODER Y LIBERTAD:  HIS-
TORIA DEL CONSTITUCIONALISMO MODERNO (Francisco Javier Ansua´tegui Roig & Manuel
Martı´nez Neira trans., 1998).
45 See Peter Haberle, Diritto costituzionale nazionale, unioni regionali fra stati e diritto
internaziomale come diritto universale dell’umanita´: convergenze e divergenze [National
constitutional law, regional unions between states and international law as a universal right
of humanity:  convergences and divergences], Conferences at Me´xico City and Bologna 2
(April 2004) (on file with authors).
46 See MORAIS, supra note 1.
47 Jurisdiction is understood here as the exercise of the judicial power and adjudication.
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On this basis, it is possible to promote a broader exercise of jurisdiction to
advance the role of constitutionalism by developing doctrines through adher-
ence to precedent that follows from a democratic state of law, even while
reshaping the character of the practice in order to fulfill the constitutional
covenant.
Because the jurisprudential task always implicates application, the inter-
preter is able to free himself from the apparent circularity of understanding.
The fundamental problem, therefore, is to break free of the grip48 of previous
positions, to handle the otherness of what is being interpreted, particularly with
regard to cases that involve human rights understood by courts in a pre-estab-
lished way.  This is exactly where the problem of temporal distance resides,
which involves the facticity and temporality of ideas.  Interpreters must culti-
vate distance as the ground of a positive and productive possibility of under-
standing.  The goal is not to eliminate the distance by filling the gap with a
definitive and complete account of human rights, but to embrace the living
elements that form a tradition.49
The development of Western constitutionalism opened the possibility that
jurisdictional entities with the authority to direct and adjudicate constitutional
power—power originally exercised by a constitutional assembly50 as an
expression of legislative power—would promote and develop a new under-
standing of fundamental rights and constitutions.  This development reshaped
the understanding and functions of each of the powers of government without
surpassing the limits inherent to structural and organizational activities of the
state, and it also served as a reminder of the risks that a violation of these limits
can cause the temptation of omnipotence.51
The reshaping of judicial power, especially with regard to adjudication,
threatens to give the judiciary the means to intrude on activities understood as
belonging to the other two branches of the government.  By changing and creat-
ing new meanings for constitutional rules, such expanded power allows the
temptation to substitute its assessment of opportunities from those expressed in
policy decisions.52  Of course, it isn’t possible to limit this power to the private
rights that define human rights in the first version, because this valence is sim-
ply its contingent history. We must see every authentic interpretation accom-
plished by the interpreter in the fulfillment of the jurisdictional power against
the backdrop of baroque ideas that appear from the spirit.53
Because the judiciary has a broader capacity and its activities can reach
further, it can be effective in checking the tendency of the executive branch to
usurp the power of the legislative branch.  The judiciary can serve as an instru-
48 GADAMER, supra note 13, at 270.
49 Heidegger connects facticity and temporality, which are constituted from two existentials,
as it was said:  “While there is something, Dasein is never past, he is the vigor of what has
been, meaning, ‘I am the vigor of what has been.’” MARTIN HEIDEGGER, SER E TEMPO 122,
125-26 (Marcia de Sa´ Cavalcante trans., 8th ed. 2001).
50 Our reference to a constitutional assembly means only the power exercised by it, without
intending any reference to original power or derivate power.
51 Vale´rio Onida, Conference Remarks 5 (Jan. 20, 2005) (reported by Corriere della Sera)
(on file with authors).
52 Id.
53 GADAMER, supra note 14, at 8-56.
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ment of accountability in a manner that broadens the classic political ideal of
democratic representation by developing, defending, and concretizing human
rights.
All these circumstances are aligned with the political transformation of a
democratic state subject to the rule of law to something that extends beyond
formal democracy.  Regarding democracy in a substantive sense, the system of
checks and balances would be viewed as a means of realizing the fundamental
rights of citizens.  Furthermore, the doctrine of separation of powers would not
be exhausted by limiting the scope of activity of the different branches of gov-
ernment, but instead would be conceived flexibly to promote a unified state that
aims to make constitutional substantive ethical values become part of the daily
lives of its citizens.54
Vale´rio Onida understands that there is a need to reread the tripartide divi-
sion of powers no longer as the legislative, executive and judiciary, but “the
powers of government and politicians, on one side and the guarantee powers on
the other.”55  To address these circumstances we should revise the classifica-
tion of state functions and align them into governmental functions, with the
traditional executive-legislative-judicial division being supplemented with
attention to a fourth function of guaranteeing human rights that is linked to the
judicial power and to adjudication.  This supplementation leads us to rethink
and discuss the role of the judiciary in a democratic state and to consider the
so-called “guarantee function” in the context of a debate about the character of
a democracy.56  This reconsideration is not a matter of overcoming all
prejudice, because before we consciously understand ourselves reflectively, we
already have understood ourselves “in a self-evident way in the family, society,
and state in which we live.”57  This means that we already understand what
democracy and its implications are before we attempt to theorize them in the
context of political theory.
It is the judicial branch, with its adjudicative role and function that shapes
and makes concrete constitutional rights.  This is a broader role than that sug-
gested by the political questions doctrine.  This new approach to government
functions and to the structure of the exercise of political power engenders a
renewed debate between the so-called “substantive conception theory.”  When
we renew this debate, we will find that these theories are not mutually exclu-
sive, but can be reconciled.  This debate is more than a conceptual revision of
constitutionalism as a substantive project to deal with doctrinal uncertainties;
54 It is our understanding that Montesquieu’s doctrine of separation of powers leads to a
fragmentary State, where the different branches of government work in isolation, not having
any relation to the other, and not compromising on developing a Constitutional State.  State
functions are linked to diverse agendas but without any mutual agreement, without having in
mind what Rousseau called the will of the people.  An example of such disconnection occurs
when the judiciary orders the executive to pay a sum of money, but the executive branch
needs the legislative branch to allocate funds in order to fulfill its obligation.
55 Onida, supra note 51, at 5.
56 See JOS ´E LUIS BOLZAN DE MORAIS ET AL., A JURISPRUDENCIALIZAC¸ ˜AO DA CONSTITUIC¸ ˜AO:
A CONSTRUC¸ ˜AO JURISDICIONAL DO ESTADO DEMOCR ´ATICO DE DIREITO IN PROGRAMMA DE
POS GRADUAC¸ ˜AO EM DIREITO (2002).
57 GADAMER, supra note 13, at 278.
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its main objective is to concretize human dignity as a constitutional value that
originates in the broader civilizing project.
The democratic project is not just a matter of “who?” and “how?”, but
most importantly must address “what?”  Democracy must be true to the interest
of everybody, of all society and not only a part of the society or the will of a
group.  However, before we connect these thoughts to the role of constitutional
law in a contemporary democracy and the specific field of concretizing human
rights, we must follow Gadamer and investigate daily experience as something
that is part of man’s essence.  This is the seat of truth:  personal images that all
members of society carry, not only as individuals, but also as members of a
community, and that give shape to the finitude of human existence.  Coming to
an understanding is the authentic result of all experience and all “getting to
know” in general.58  In our opinion, this is the productive point of contact
between Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, which explores how compre-
hension comes from tradition, and Santos’ diatopic hermeneutics, which uses
translation as a metaphor of how we create reciprocal intelligibilities among
cultures—which can facilitate a break with an inauthentic constitutional
tradition.
VI. THE ESSENTIALITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN THE SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACIES
We conclude that constitutionalism is vital, especially the judicial role of
adjudication when considering contemporary problems.  If democracy is to be
preserved and embraced with a substantive conception and not regarded only as
a game of democratic rules as argued by Bobbio,59 the implementation of the
humanitarian contents of human rights must transform the democratic state
with the rule of law as its ground.
58 This was also Gadamer’s lesson when connecting experience to consciousness of the
effect of history.  Hermeneutics does not have its effectiveness in methodological certainty,
but in the prompt disposition to the experience that characterizes human life. Id. at 368.
59 NORBERTO BOBBIO, O FUTURO DA DEMOCRACIA:  UMA DEFESA DAS REGRAS DO JOGO
170-71 (1987).
